Abstract. This document integrates GHM model and Nash-bargain game into dynamic game of north-south framework with heterogeneous firms, and uses backward deduction method to resolve the equilibrium organization structure of heterogeneous firms. This document argues that the degree of technological dependency of final-good producers on the intermediate suppliers is the key to the optimal organization structure of heterogeneous final-good produces. It concludes that when final-good producers in head-quarter intensive industry, get intermediate input from home country, and when final-good producers in component intensive industry get intermediate input from foreign the degree of technological dependency of final-good producer on intermediate supplier is very important for his organization structure.
Introduction
Since 1980s, international division of labor has developed from inter-industry to intra-industry and then intra-product. Vertical integration (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and horizontal integration (Markusen, 1984) is the earliest integration theories [1, 2, 3] . Then Markusen(2002) created a knowledge capital model incorporating both of them [4] . Motta and Norman(1996) , Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter(2001) , Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen(2007) considered that two-countries model cannot explain the whole story of organization structure of firms specifically the export of foreign affiliate to the third country rather than home country and host country [5, 6, 7] . Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen(2007) created "export-platform" integration model explaining the foreign direct investment from home country to host country companied with the trade between host country and the third country. Yeaple(2003) quantized transportation cost, factor endowment and industry-specific factor intensity to analysis the complex strategies of heterogeneous [8] .
At the end of 1990s, lots of empirical studies triggered the review on the assumption of homogeneous firms within industries. Clerides et al.(1996 Clerides et al.( ,1998 using Taiwan data and Baldwin and Gu (2003) using Canadian data found that only firms with large scale and high productivity exported in the so-called export industry [9, 10, 11] . Then Melitz(2003) constructed a Monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms which has been a footstone of studies on heterogeneous firms in an industry. [12] Antrà s(2003) using U.S. panel data found that intrafirm imports in U.S., is significantly positive correlative with the capital intensity of the exporting industry and capital-labor ratio of the exporting country [13] . And it incorporated GHM with Krugman and Helpman (1985) with their variable profit, and the variable profit is higher under outsourcing organization. If the final goods are head-quarter intensive, the residual control rights of final-good producers are positive correlative with their variable profit, and the variable profit is higher under integration organization. [14] This document extends Antràs and Helpman(2004) by constructing an theoretical model and arguing that the degree of technological dependency of final-good producer on intermediate supplier also play an important role on the organization structure.
Setup
There are two countries: home (H) and foreign (F), sharing identical preference of representative consumers, which is given by a C.E.S. utility function
Where j  is the ratio of expenditure on final products in industry j to total income EL, LH,F, and
) represents elasticity of substitution between any two final varieties. Demand function of repensentive consumer is
, and ). Therefore we assume that foreign country has the unit cost advantage.
Since from now on we discuss a particular industry, we drop the index j from all the variables. Final-good producer i Z can get i m by two means which are integration (V) and outsourcing (O). Based on GHM model, under both organization, final-good producer needs to contract with intermedite supplier and suffers distortion of incomplete contrat, which measn they cannot sign ex-ante enforceable contracts specifying the price and quantity of i m . Final-good producer and intermediate supplier bargains over the surplus from the relationship after i m have been produced and delivered. The ex-post bargaining is as a Nash Bargaining game in which the final-good producer obtain a fraction  ( M is independent supplier, and a failure to reach an agreement on the distribution of the surplus leaves both parties with no income.
According to Nash bargain game, under integration organization, if they fail to agree on a contract, the outside option of i M is zero. 
And by maximizing their expected profit, we can get the output of i h , i m and i y as follow To incorporate (6)- (9) into (4), we gan get the equilibrium profit of i Z is
Organization structure analysis
There are two kinds of organization structure, which are integration and outsourcing. To 
